The following text is some extracts of ideas I saw.
Europe’s northern lights
By Dominique Moïsi
In China, capitalism prospers without democracy. In fact, a contemporary Chinese joke is very indicative of how the country perceives its role in today’s world. “In 1949, communism saved China; in 1979, capitalism saved China; and in 2009, China saved capitalism.”
One can behave in such a manner, many Europeans outside of Scandinavia say, only if one has been raised according to the Protestant ethic. For Greeks, Italians, and many French, evading taxes is a kind of national pastime, which some even perceive as a moral duty. Politics is a game, and power a drug that allows you to rise above ordinary citizens. And the temptation to consider oneself the incarnation of the state, rather than its servant, is often irresistible among southern European politicians.
Of course, it is dangerous to idealise the Scandinavian model. Scandinavian countries have their share of problems, such as Denmark’s significant xenophobic extreme right and Norway’s occasional bouts of provincial Puritanism.
But the difference between these countries and their southern counterparts in terms of economic performance, social climate and political culture are plainly visible. The weak and sick men of Europe – from Greece to Spain – are to be found in the south, not the north.
PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION:
IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT
Robert L. Hirsch, SAIC, Project Leader
Roger Bezdek, MISI
Robert Wendling, MISI
The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world with an
unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached, liquid fuel
prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely mitigation,
the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented. Viable mitigation
options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but to have substantial
impact, they must be initiated more than a decade in advance of peaking.
In 2003, the world consumed just under 80 million barrels per day (MM bpd) of
oil. U.S. consumption was almost 20 MM bpd, two-thirds of which was in the
transportation sector. The U.S. has a fleet of about 210 million automobiles and
light trucks (vans, pick-ups, and SUVs). The average age of U.S. automobiles is
nine years. Under normal conditions, replacement of only half the automobile
fleet will require 10-15 years. The average age of light trucks is seven years.
Under normal conditions, replacement of one-half of the stock of light trucks will
require 9-14 years. While significant improvements in fuel efficiency are possible
in automobiles and light trucks, any affordable approach to upgrading will be
inherently time-consuming, requiring more than a decade to achieve significant
overall fuel efficiency improvement.
Besides further oil exploration, there are commercial options for increasing world
oil supply and for the production of substitute liquid fuels: 1) Improved Oil
Recovery (IOR) can marginally increase production from existing reservoirs; one
of the largest of the IOR opportunities is Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which
can help moderate oil production declines from reservoirs that are past their peak
production: 2) Heavy oil / oil sands represents a large resource of lower grade
oils, now primarily produced in Canada and Venezuela; those resources are
capable of significant production increases;. 3) Coal liquefaction is a wellestablished
technique for producing clean substitute fuels from the world’s
abundant coal reserves; and finally, 4) Clean substitute fuels can be produced
from remotely located natural gas, but exploitation must compete with the world’s
growing demand for liquefied natural gas. However, world-scale contributions
from these options will require 10-20 years of accelerated effort.
Dealing with world oil production peaking will be extremely complex, involve
literally trillions of dollars and require many years of intense effort. To explore
these complexities, three alternative mitigation scenarios were analyzed:
! Scenario I assumed that action is not initiated until peaking occurs.
! Scenario II assumed that action is initiated 10 years before peaking.
! Scenario III assumed action is initiated 20 years before peaking.
For this analysis estimates of the possible contributions of each mitigation option
were developed, based on an assumed crash program rate of implementation.
What kind of the world we like to live?
>fish, climate change
China is already on the path to achieve energy efficiency ahead of the US.
What fraction of population in other nations must be smart enough to compete with Japan? (If all the other conditions are considered to have same impacts. )
If 50% of Japanese people are competitive, then
China needs only 4.7%
UK 100.2% of their population to compete with with Japan. This idea disproportionally favors populous nations. Smaller nations may be able to reach effective national policies more easily and have less people to feed. Many none competitive people surely drive their nations downward even though they may be good consumers. Interaction and collaboration between nations and many factors make the definition of national competitiveness more bluer.
Planter mes pieds en éventail
La vie en bleu dont tu parlais
La vie en rose comme un banc de sable